IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(Kansas City Docket)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ))
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
GUY MADISON NEIGHBORS )
and )
CARRIE MARIE NEIGHBORS, )
)
Defendants. )
Case No. 07-20124-01/02-CM
UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO REVOKE BOND
COMES NOW, the United States of America by and through the undersigned
Assistant United States Attorney and hereby moves the Court to revoke the defendants’
pretrial release bond on the grounds that they are a danger to the community and are
not amenable to supervision. In support of this motion, the government offers the
following:
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 20, 2007, the defendants were granted pretrial release under the
terms of an Order Setting Conditions of Release and both signed the Order
acknowledging that he/she was aware of the conditions of release. (Documents [Docs.]
5 and 9). The conditions of the defendants’ release included a provision that stated that
the “defendant shall not commit any offense in violation of federal, state or local law
2
while on release in this case.” (Id. at 1) The defendants have failed to comply with that
condition. The Order also contained a condition that required that the defendants “avoid
all contact, directly or indirectly, with any persons who are or who may become a victim
or potential witness in the subject investigation or prosecution....” (Id. at 2) The
defendants have failed to comply with that provision as well.
APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Bond revocations are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3148 which states in pertinent
part:
(a) Available sanctions.– A person who has been released under
section 3142 of this title, and who has violated a condition of his release, is
subject to a revocation of release, an order of detention and a prosecution for
contempt of court.
(b) Revocation of release .– The attorney for the Government may initiate a
proceeding for revocation of an order of release by filing a motion with the district
court. A judicial officer may issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged
with violating a condition of release, and the person shall be brought before a
judicial officer in the district in which such person’s arrest was ordered for a
proceeding in accordance with this section. To the extent practicable, a person
charged with violating the condition of release that such person not commit a
Federal, State or local crime during the period of release, shall be brought before
the judicial officer who ordered the release and whose order is alleged to have
been violated. The judicial officer shall enter an order of revocation and
detention if, after a hearing, the judicial officer–
` The judicial officer shall enter an order of
revocation and detention if, after a hearing, the judicial officer-
(1) finds that there is-
(A) probable cause to believe that the person has committed a
Federal, State, or local crime while on release; or
(B) clear and convincing evidence that the person has violated any
other condition of release; and
(2) finds that-
(A) based on the factors set forth in section 3142(g) of this title,
there is no condition or combination of conditions of release that will
assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to the safety of any
other person or the community; or
(B) the person is unlikely to abide by any condition or combination
of conditions of release.
If there is probable cause to believe that, while on release, the person committed
a Federal, State or local felony, a rebuttable presumption arises that no condition
of combination of conditions will assure the person will not pose a danger to the
safety of any other person in the community.
Id. “[A] district’s court’s finding that a defendant will not abide by any conditions of
release may be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v.
Aron, 904 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1990) (Section 3148(b) clearly provides that these
findings alone are sufficient to justify revocation and detention and court need not also find the defendant will flee or pose danger to the community).
As the following discussion will establish, the defendants’ conduct has
established that there is no condition or combination of conditions that will assure the safety of other persons in the community and that the defendant is unlikely to abide by the conditions of his release.
VIOLATIONS OF CRIMINAL STATUTES
A. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512, Tampering with a Witness
In this case, the United States submits that there is sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause to believe that the defendants have committed violations of
criminal statutes. Specifically, the government alleges that the defendants have
violated Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512, a federal felony, which provides in
pertinent part:
(c) Whoever corruptly –
* * *
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding or
attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years or both,
4
(d) Whoever intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders,
delays, prevents or dissuades any person from –
(1) attending or testifying in an official proceeding;
* * *
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 3
years.
Id.
The mens rea for § 1512 is a knowing use of corrupt persuasion with an intent to
interfere with official proceedings. See United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 348 (6th
Cir. 1984), United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1994). In the context of
§ 1512(c), the term “corruptly” is defined as “acting ‘with the purpose of wrongfully
impeding the due administration of justice.’” United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698,
706 (7th Cir. 2007) (Instruction using term “wrongfully” in definition of “corruptly” properly directed jury to convict only those who have no legal right to impede justice.) To establish violations of §1512, the government need not prove that the defendant successfully prevented, hindered or dissuaded a witness from testifying. “The totality of the evidence must also be considered in light of Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 31(c), which provides that a defendant may be found guilty of an attempt to commit an offense if the attempt is, as here, itself an offense.” United States v. Brown, 217 F.3d 247, 256 (5th Cir. 2000) (Sending of harassing letter to witness sufficient to establish violation of § 1512(c) where jury concluded from wording of the letter that defendant meant a not-soveiled threat against the witness).
For over a year, these defendants have engaged in conduct amounting to corrupt
attempts to influence an official proceeding and intentional harassment of another
person intending to prevent or dissuade witnesses from attending or testifying in an
official proceeding by publishing false and libelous allegations of illegal activity and misconduct against several of the government’s witnesses.
For example on April 11, 2008, the defendants published a message on the
yellowhousestore blog falsely accusing Det. Michael McAtee, of various felonies and
misdemeanors.
Detective McAtee of the Lawrence, Kansas, Police Department is a
potential witness in this case because he participated in this investigation.
Among the false accusations in the posting are claims that McAtee was suspended from the police department “for drugs missing from the police evidence room; that he was hired for the police dept. in KC but was let go because his UA [urine analysis] came in dirty;” that cases had been “thrown out of court because officer McAtee failed to turn in all of the evidence; that he “has been served a federal subpoena and can not testify in any of his pending cases” and that he “has failed 30 drug test [sic].” (Exhibit 1a, p. 1-2). The posting goes on to concede that the author does not know whether these allegations are true, but urges readers to call McAtee and ask him about the allegations and provides McAtee’s contact numbers. Id. at 2. (See also, Exhibit 1b, p. 2)
(defendants acknowledge that they do not know whether allegations of wrongdoing against Det. McAtee made by others are true.)
Other potential government witnesses have also been targeted for harassment.
For example, Officer Micky Rantz has been falsely accused of, among other things,
planting evidence in the Yellow House Trash (Exhibit 2a, p. 1), of stealing money and
guns from a person arrested in an unrelated case (Exhibit 2b); and, along with Officer Jay Bialek, of impersonating F.B.I. agents and stealing computers. (Exhibit 2c, p. 2); (Exhibit 2d, p. 1).
Even more pernicious are the defendants’ attempts to dissuade other witnesses
from testifying in this case by falsely claiming that if they do so, they will be subjected to additional punishment.
On April 22, 2008, after the entry of guilty pleas by two cooperating co-conspirators, the defendants on their corruptioninjusticedepartment blog state that if the two witnesses testify at the trial of this case, they “could both be slapped with Federal Perjury charges and have 5 more years added to their sentences! Then if they get 5 years for the perjured testimony they already gave before the Grand Jury, then is prosecutor [Parker] setting them up for an additional 10 years added to their sentence.” (Exhibit 3, p. 2).
These unfounded threats against the cooperating conspirators constitute harassment corruptly designed by the defendants to dissuade the witnesses from attending and testifying at the trial of this case for fear that they will be subjected to additional prison time if they testify contrary to the defendants’ version
of the facts.
Unquestionably, the defendants are corruptly endeavoring and attempting to
dissuade Det. McAtee, Officers Rantz and Bialek and other law enforcement personnel
and cooperating witnesses from providing testimony for fear that their reputations will be unjustly and falsely impugned, that they will be named in civil lawsuits under § 1983,(See Exhibit 4, p. 1-2) or that their sentences will be increased if they testify in ways the defendants find objectionable.
The defendants’ harassing conduct in relation to the witnesses expected to testify
for the government constitutes a violation of federal felony statute 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and is sufficient ground for revoking defendants’ pretrial release bond.
1“Actual malice” occurs when a defendant makes a false publication with a “high
degree of awareness of ...probable falsity,” (citation omitted) or must have “entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667; 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2686 (1989).
B. Kansas Statutes Annotated (K.S.A.), § 21-4004, Criminal Defamation
The United States further submits that the defendants have violated at least one
state misdemeanor statute, K.S.A. § 21-4004, Criminal Defamation, which provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Criminal defamation is communicating to a person orally, in
writing, or by any other means, information, knowing the information to be
false and with actual malice1, tending to expose another living person to
public hatred, contempt or ridicule; intending to deprive such person of the
benefits of public confidence and social acceptance....
This statute has been challenged on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth and
in each instance, its constitutionality has been upheld. In Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1995), the court construed a prior version of the statute that required that a defendant act “maliciously” to violate the statute as constitutional on the ground that it required “actual malice.” In State v. Carson, 95 P.3d 1042, 2004 WL 1878312 (Kan.Appl. Aug. 20, 2004) the Kansas Appellate Court determined that the use of the word “tending” in the statute did not lower the government’s burden of proof to less than beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.
Most recently, the Hon. John W. Lungstrum in How v. City of Baxter Springs, Kansas, 369 F.Supp. 1300, 1309 (D. Kan. 2005) rejected claims that the state criminal defamation statute was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.
The defendants’ persistent defamatory allegations made against Det. Michael
McAtee, made in spite of the fact that they have been informed, that the allegations are false. On February 22, 2007, the defendant, Guy Neighbors, sent an e-mail message to various persons alleging that Det. McAtee had been suspended for stealing drugs from the evidence room and “had to go to rehab.” (Exhibit 5a, p. 2). In response to these false allegations, an attorney representing Det. McAtee sent letters to Guy Neighbors informing him that “[a]ll of these allegations ... are outrageous and false and you know it.” (Exhibit 5b).
In spite of having actual knowledge of the falsity of the allegations
against Det. McAtee, the defendant has continued to publish the defamatory statements
concerning alleged wrongdoing by Det. McAtee.
On July 29, 2007, the defendants posted allegations that Det. McAtee
misappropriated seized items for his personal use.
(Exhibit 1b, p. 2).
Again on April 11, 2008, the defendants made the following false and defamatory claims:
The word on the street is Officer Mcatee [sic] was suspended from the
Lawrence police dept. for drugs missing from the police evidence room.
Sources in K.C. stated Mr. Mcatee [sic] was hired for the police dept. in
K.C. but was let go because his UA came in dirty. We have had several
customers tell us that they had cases thrown out of court because officer
Mcatee [sic] failed to turn in all of the evidence (drugs) and when it was
time for trial some of the evidence was missing.... We have had
numerous people tell us that officer Mcatee [sic] dose [sic] traffic stops
and takes people’s drugs and allows them to go with out a ticket and he
keeps the drug (for what ever reason). We have 2 different people tell us
they was [sic] in rehab.... [W]e have heard that office [sic] Mcatee[sic] has
failed 30 drug test [sic], could this be true? (Exhibit 1a, p. 1-2).
On both July 29, 2007 and April 11, 2008, the defendants
themselves acknowledged in their postings that they do not know if the allegations are true. (Exhibit 1a & 1b).
These false accusations against Det. McAtee were clearly published with a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity when the defendants admit that they had serious doubts as to the truth the postings.
This conduct constitutes violations of the Kansas State statute prohibiting criminal defamation which violates the terms of the defendants’ pretrial release.
Additionally, the defendants have made unfounded defamatory allegations
against other members of the Lawrence Police Department.
For instance, on March 14, 2008, the defendants allege that Officer Micky Rantz planted evidence in connection with the ongoing investigation. (Exhibit 2a, p. 2).
These postings containing false allegations against government witnesses also constitute violations of state law, specifically of K.S.A. § 21-4004, triggering the presumption that the defendants will not abide by the conditions of their bond.
C. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503, Influencing an Officer
The government also alleges that the defendant has violated Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1503, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever corruptly ... endeavors to influence, intimidate
or impede any ... officer in or of any court of the United States, ... in the discharge of his duties ... or corruptly ... influences, obstructs or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b) The punishment for an offense under this section is –
***
(3) in another case, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under
this title, or both.
“The main body of the obstruction of justice statute specifically targets conduct that interferes with the duties of a juror or court officer. The omnibus clause is essentially a catch-all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due administration of justice.” United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 650 n. 3 (11th Cir 1990); United States v. Partin 555 F2d 621, 631 (5th Cir. 1977)(“[S]pecific wording of 10 section 1503 was intended to forbid certain means of obstructing justice, while the omnibus clause aims at obstruction of justice itself, regardless of the means used to reach that result.”)
Assistant United States Attorneys engaged in the prosecution of criminal cases in
United States District Courts are “officers” within the meaning of this statute. See
United States v. Mahasin, 442 F. 3d 687 (8th Cir. 2006) (prosecution for assault on
Assistant United States Attorney engaged in official duties under 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)
affirmed); see also, United States v. Joiner, 418 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2005) (defendant convicted of violation of § 1503(a) where false UCC filing was made in connection with discharge of prosecutor’s officials); United States v. Fernandez, 837 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir.1988) (conviction under § 1503 appropriate where prosecutor threatened by defendant’s brother immediately after defendant sentenced).
As used in the context of section 1503, the term “corruptly” “means acting
illegally or unlawfully.” United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 242 (10th Cir. 1979)
(Defendant’s conviction affirmed where jury found he attempted to influence juror in
another case by providing her with document entitled “A Handbook for Jurors” which
advocated juror nullification and taught that tax crimes not true crimes.) By the inclusion of the qualifying term “corrupt,” the statute does not proscribe lawful or constitutionally protected speech. See United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, (2d. Cir. 1996)(analogizing “corrupt” mens rea contained in §1503 with that term as found in §1512(b).)
The obstruction of justice statute possess a limited standard of
culpability that confines its coverage to constitutionally unprotected
activity, which stems from its explicit mens rea requirement that a person
must “corruptly” endeavor to interfere with the due administration of
justice. Thus one must impede the due administration of justice with the general intent of knowledge as well as the specific intent of purpose to obstruct.
United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 670 (6th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981) (“corruptly” as used in §
1503 requires that act in question be done ”with the purpose of obstructing justice.”)
A defendant’s actions need not be successful to sustain a conviction under
§1503. An “endeavor” having the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice will suffice. The government must, however, establish that the accused acted “with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence an ancillary proceeding such as an investigation independent of the court’s or grand jury’s authority.” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2362 (1995). “Interference can occur despite the absence of any personal contact with a juror, witness or official.” United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978)(Attempt to sell grand jury transcripts constituted obstruction of justice under the omnibus clause of § 1503)
In this case, the defendants’ conduct has clearly established that they have
published false and libelous accusations against the government’s attorney in this case, an officer of the court, with the express purpose of endeavoring to influence, intimidate and impede counsel in the performance of her official duties.
For example, on April 22,2008, the defendants falsely asserted in their internet site, yellowhousestore.blogspot, that counsel for the government had used racial epithets in her office three times.
The defendants next posed a series of rhetorical questions including:
Could these words be directed at me because I happened to be a black man?
2 By this admission, the author clearly acknowledged that he is Guy N.
Neighbors, one of the defendants in this case.
The defendants currently stand charged in two cases in this court, the second
involving allegations of manufacturing marijuana which is being prosecuted by a
different Assistant United States Attorney, Terra Morehead. The text of this blog establishes that both defendants participated in drafting this message. The photo attached to the posting is that of defendant Guy N. Neighbors and the caption reads “Picture show [sic] the new hat my family sent me for standing up for
my rights and refusing the so-called deal.” (Exhibit 7, p. 1-2).
Later in the body of the message, the author refers to “my attorney, Phil Gibson,” the attorney for defendant Carrie Marie Neighbors.
Could this be because I am a black man and a pain in her side because I have been posting the laws she has broken trying to get me in jail.
Who would leave such a [sic] email on my blog site?
Could it be someone who is sick of watching her violate people’s civil
rights and would like to see her in jail some place where she would not be
able to continue to making [sic] a mockery out of the U.S. Justice system?
(Exhibit 6, p. 2). At the end of the posting, the blog included the following statement:
P.S. The prosecutors3 could make it easy on them self’s [sic] and do the
right thing by dropping the charges because we are NEVER going to
take the plea and give up NOT in a million years.
Id. (Emphasis added). This admission clearly and unequivocally establishes that the
defendants allegations against counsel for the government are made corruptly with the
intent to coerce counsel for the United States to dismiss the charges in this case to stopthe false accusations. This posting alone would be sufficient grounds to revoke the defendants’ bond for the commission of a federal felony crime, but the defendants’ illegal behavior is not confined to this single instance.
On April 24, 2008, on another internet site, corruptioninjusticedepartment, the
defendants again endeavored to interfere with the administration of justice by
threatening to issue subpoenas for the testimony of the government attorneys
5 The defendants’ statements in their various postings (attached as Exhibits 8a
through 8g) leave no doubt as to their intent. Those postings show a persistent and
systematic attempt to harass government counsel to induce the dismissal of the
charges in this case, actions that constitute violations of § 1503. (See Exhibit 8a, p. 2),
November, 2007: “To permit Marietta N. Parker and Terra D. Morehead to continue to
fumble along with this case would make a MOCKERY of our criminal justice system;”
(Exhibit 8b, p. 2),
November 14, 2007: “Therefore U.S. Attorney Marietta Parker should be held accountable for her actions and removed from the Yellow House Store
Prosecution; (Exhibit 8c, p. 2),
December 25, 2007: “... so please help us the little GUY
get the job done by calling, emailing or writing any or all of these government officials involved in our case. Please ask ‘Why is This Case Not Dropped....”; (Exhibit 8d, p.3),
December 29, 2007: “Or just call her [Parker’s] Boss Mr. Eric F. Melgren U.S. Attorney District of Kansas ... Please ask him why he allows her to screw up so bad in a case and not drop the charges? If more citizens could stand up against the government’s ILLEGAL actions just think what a difference we could make standing together.... [S]o please help us the little GUY get the job done by calling, emailing or writing any or all of these government officials involved in our case. Please ask ‘Why is this Case Not Dropped’....”; (Exhibit 8e),
December 25, 2007: ”the Yellow House Business owners alleged Vindictive prosecution by Federal Prosecutors Marietta Parker and Terra D. Morehead # 12759 in the Yellow House Investigation and request dismissal of all charges and further request sanctions be placed against the prosecutor’s office.... (p. 1);
[S]o please help us the little GUY get the job done by calling, emailing or writing any or all of these government officials involved in our case. Please ask ‘Why is this Case Not Dropped’....” (p. 2) ; (Exhibit 8f, p. 4), February 6, 2008: “... write to: [list of officials}
prosecuting the two criminal cases currently pending against them. They go on to state that under those circumstances “the courts would have no choice but to dismiss this case with prejudice and end this gross miscarriage of Justice that has been allowed to continue for too long.” (Exhibit 7, p. 6).
These statements, taken in the context of this case, clearly establish that the
defendants are engaged in a campaign, waged on the internet and by e-mail, to
corruptly influence and impede the government attorneys in the discharge of their
duties, the prosecution of the charges filed in this case. The defendants regularly make false allegations of legal and ethical wrongdoing against the government’s attorneys endeavoring to corruptly influence, obstruct and impede the prosecution of their cases. 5omitted]. Tell them Marietta Parker and Terra D. Morehead should be FIRED.”; (Exhibit 8g, p. 3),
March 5, 2008: If you would like to help the Yellow business Owners please
call Parker’s Office and ask why these charges have not been dropped....”; (Exhibit 8h, p. 1), January 17, 2008 entitled “Why the prosecutor Marietta Parker should be removed from Yellow House case:”
6 The defendants go on to state “Rev. Stat. 1979 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1983
Clearly suggests liability of ‘every person’ who, acting under color of state law, commits the prohibited acts. Therefore U.S. Attorney Marietta Parker should be held
accountable for her actions and removed from the Yellow House Store Prosecution.” Id.
The reference to this statute is a direct threat to file a civil law suit against counsel for the government for civil rights violations, a tactic analogous to that used in United States v. Joiner, 481 F.3d at 868 where the defendant was convicted of violation of § 1503(a) for a false UCC filing that was made in connection with discharge of prosecutor’s official duties. This is yet another iteration of the defendants’ persistent harassment of government counsel as they endeavor to obtain an wrongful result, the dismissal of the charges in this case.
By the consistent harassment of the government’s attorney, the defendants are
corruptly attempting to have the charges dismissed or to have government counsel
removed from the case or fired from her position. Under any of these scenarios, the
prosecution of this case would be obstructed or impeded.
In support of their demands for the dismissal of the charges or the removal of
government counsel from the prosecution of this case, the defendants make blatantly
false accusations of misconduct and illegal actions against counsel for the government.
These allegations include claims that government counsel
conspired with Lawrence Police officers, delaying and creating
obstructions of justice from the judicial process, conspired with police to
commence a surveillance operation absent of [sic] a court order, ordered a
fraudulent FBI investigation using the non resident agency for Douglas
County, conspired with police to falsify documents, and conspired with a
four time convicted felon ... to present PURJURY [sic] evidence to a grand
jury in order to shield herself from liability fo any constitutional wrong
against innocent citizens by ensuring that they go to trial.6
(Exhibit 8h, p. 5); see also, (Exhibit 8a, p. 2)
(government counsel has fabricated and tampered with evidence).
These false allegations against government counsel are
attempts by the defendants to interfere with and impede the due administration of
justice and constitute the violation of a federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
Consequently, the defendants have violated the terms and conditions of their bond by
engaging in this illegal conduct.
VIOLATIONS OF CONDITION 7(j) OF ORDER SETTING CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
As stated previously, among the conditions of the defendant’s bond is the
condition that requires that they “avoid all contact, directly or indirectly, with any persons who are or who may become a victim or potential witness in the subject investigation or prosecution....” (Docs. 5 and 9, at 2) The defendant Guy N. Neighbors, has on several occasions violated that condition by having direct and indirect contact with several of members of the Lawrence, Kansas, Police Department who they know are potential witnesses in this case.
On Monday, April 14, 2008, the defendant, Guy Neighbors contacted
Det. McAtee by telephone. The defendants’ posting of April 11, 2008, had falsely
reported that McAtee had failed thirty (30) drug tests and had provided contact numbers for the detective. (Exhibit 4a, p. 1-2).
During the phone conversation, the defendant posed as an anonymous member of the public and demanded that he be given the results of McAtee’s drug tests. The telephone call was placed from a telephone number associated with the Yellow House and McAtee recognized the defendant’s voice and speech pattern from numerous prior instances when he had heard the defendant speak.
On Monday evening, April 14, 2008, the defendant was observed driving by Officer Jay Bialek’s residence. He was observed again on Tuesday morning, April 15, 2008, again driving past Officer Bialek’s home. Because Bialek does not live on a through street, the reasonable inference from the defendant’s conduct on those days is
that the defendant was in that area stalking Bialek.
Between March 22, 2008 and April 25, 2008, Postal Inspector David Nitz
received eleven (11) e-mail messages on his business e-mail account, consisting of
some of the defendants’ postings. (Exhibit 9). The defendants have repeatedly
acknowledged in their internet postings Inspector Nitz’s participation in this investigation and hence, their knowledge of his status as a potential witness in this case, yet they have repeatedly instigated contact with him in violation of the conditions of their bond.
The defendants have made it clear on their internet postings that they know
these law enforcement officers were involved in the investigation of the Yellow House
fencing operations and that they are potential witnesses in the trial of this case.
Consequently, these numerous contacts with the witnesses clearly violates condition
7(j) of the court’s Order Setting Conditions of Release.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests
that the defendant’s bond be revoked on the grounds that they have violated the
conditions of their pretrial release by committing additional state and federal crimes, including violations of federal felony statutes, and has violated condition 7(j) of the Order Setting Conditions, thereby raising the presumption that they will not abide by the conditions previously imposed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
Eric F. Melgren
United States Attorney
s/ Marietta Parker, KS Dist. Ct. #77807
MARIETTA PARKER
Assistant United States Attorney
500 State Avenue; Suite 360
Kansas City, Kansas 66101
Telephone: 913-551-6730
Facsimile: 913-551-6541
E-mail: marietta.parker@usdoj.gov
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of May, 2008, the foregoing was electronically
filed with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:
Phillip R. Gibson
Thomason& Gibson, L.L.C
2400 S. Lee’s Summit Rd., Suite 200
Independence, MO 64055
eMail: Phil0704@aol.com
Attorney for Defendant Carrie Marie Neighbors
Cheryl A. Pilate
Morgan Pilate LLC
142 N. Cherry
Olathe, KS 66061
Attorney for Guy Madison Neighbors
I further certify that on this date the foregoing document and the notice of
electronic filing were mailed by first-class mail to the following non-CM/ECF participants:
None
s/ Marietta Parker, KS Dist. Ct. #77807
MARIETTA PARKER
Assistant United States Attorney
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