Green argues that incriminating evidence from the November and December searches of his house 5 should be suppressed because the WPD officers who investigated him, obtained warrants to search his residence, and executed that warrant were acting outside their jurisdiction. It is evident, and indeed the government does not contest, Appellee's Br. at 11, that the WPD officers were acting outside their jurisdiction in violation of Kansas law, which provides that


(2) Law enforcement officers employed by any city may exercise their powers as law enforcement officers:


(a) Anywhere within the city limits of the city employing them and outside of such city when on property owned or under the control of such city; and


(a)in any other place when a request for assistance has been made by law enforcement officers from that place or when in fresh pursuit of a person.


Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2401a(2) (West 1995); see State v. Sodders , 872 P.2d 736, 738-40 (Kan. 1994).
Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (10th Cir.1990)
"It is, however, well established in this circuit that `in federal prosecutions the test of reasonableness in relation to the Fourth Amendment protected rights must be determined by Federal law even though the police actions are those of state police officers.'" United States v. Le , -- F. 3d --, --, 1999 WL 176192, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar. 31, 1999) (quoting United States v. Miller , 452 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1971)). This is because "`the exclusionary rule is only concerned with deterring [federal] Constitutional violations.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Wright , 16 F.3d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1994)). Thus, "the fact that the arrest, search, or seizure may have violated state law is irrelevant as long as the standards developed under the Federal Constitution were not offended." Id. (citation omitted).

Green argues that we have applied state law in past cases where we have considered whether a search was lawful, citing United States v. Richardson , 86 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Price , 75 F.3d 1440 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Occhipinti , 998 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1993); and United States v. Ibarra , 955 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1992). Indeed, in Price and Occhipinti , Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-2401a was the state statute at issue. Green, however, misinterprets our cases. In Price , we explained that our discussion regarding whether the Kansas statute was complied with in that case was secondary to the federal constitutional inquiry mandated by the Fourth Amendment. We stated that, in that case, the defendant's argument that the Kansas statute was violated failed in any event, because the officers had not acted in violation of the statute. Price , 75 F.3d at 1443; see also Richardson , 86 F.3d at 1544; Occhipinti , 998 F.2d at 798-99. However, we were careful to point out that even if the Kansas statute had been violated, that would not have ended the inquiry, because "[t]he authority in a federal case for suppressing evidence due to an unlawful search is the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. A violation of state law may or may not form the basis for suppression on Fourth Amendment grounds." Price , 75 F.3d at 1443-44 (citations omitted); cf. Ibarra , 955 F.2d at 1409-10 (conducting a Fourth Amendment inquiry even after finding that the state statute was violated).

In an effort to link the WPD officers' violation of state statutory law to the Fourth Amendment, Green cites Ross v. Neff , 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1990). In that case, we held that "an arrest made outside of the arresting officer's jurisdiction violates the Fourth Amendment . . . ." Id. at 1353-54. That case, however, is distinguishable from the case at hand in one major respect: Ross involved a warrantless arrest outside the arresting officer's jurisdiction. Id. at 1354 (stating that "[a] warrantless arrest outside the arresting officer's jurisdiction is analogous to a warrantless arrest without probable cause" and that "[a]bsent exigent circumstances, such an arrest is presumptively unreasonable"). A warrantless arrest is vastly different from a warranted search. In the case before us, there is no dispute that the WPD officers obtained search warrants from magistrates of the relevant jurisdiction. We decline to extend Ross to the context of warranted searches.

The federal constitutional standards for evaluating the validity of search warrants are well established. The Fourth Amendment requires only that the warrant contain "probable cause supported by an oath or affirmation and a particular description of the place, persons and things to be searched and seized." United States v. Wicks , 995 F.2d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 1993). These requirements were clearly met in this case. Green does not contest that probable cause, albeit allegedly tainted by the violation of the Kansas statute, 6 existed to support each of the three challenged searches, including the December search of the van discussed below, see Appellant's Br. at 19, 24, and he has not attempted to argue, either on appeal or before the district court, that the warrants were not sufficiently particular.

In sum, there was no federal constitutional violation in this case. The Fourth Amendment is satisfied where, as here, officers obtain a warrant, grounded in probable cause and phrased with sufficient particularity, from a magistrate of the relevant jurisdiction 7 authorizing them




These issues are not amenable to compromise. Official acts are either constitutional or they are not. There are no degrees of constitutionality. No shades of grey. No matters of opinion.


Any attempt to enforce an unconstitutional act is almost certainly a violation of someone's civil rights, and is, therefore, itself a violation of criminal law, specifically 18 USC 242, and perhaps 18 USC 241. Enforcement of unconstitutional acts is a crime, and those who enforce them are criminals. Failure to prosecute such crimes is a violation of one's oath of office to the Constitution, and grounds for removal from office. It may also itself be a criminal act in violation of 18 USC 241.


They state that "The Constitution gave Congress jurisdiction over only three crimes: treason, counterfeiting, and piracy on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations.". That's four crimes, not three. "Piracy (and felonies) on the high seas" is a distinct category from "offenses against the laws of nations". The distinction is important, and needs to be better understood.

They neglect to mention that the Fourteenth Amendment added a fifth category: deprivation of civil rights by the State, that is, by agents of government. Although the amendment is not explicit about whether criminal powers were included, the legislative history of the debates on the amendment make it clear that that was intended. The most important federal criminal statutes under this amendment are 18 USC 241, Conspiracy Against Rights, and 18 USC 242, Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, and they are constitutional. The amendment does not provide authority to impose criminal sanctions against deprivation of rights by parties who are not government agents.