pro-se right to hyrid defense

6) If the Court decides that it has the right to deny the Respondent
due process by refusing to consider his post trial motions, then the
Judge is refusing to do the work of the Court. If the Judge refuses
to do the work of the Court then he lacks the authority and
immunities of the Court. If the Judge can not or will not perform his
duties as Judge then he is obligated under Law to recuse himself and
get out of the way of justice.


A Judge who stands in the way of justice and the law is acting
outside of all judicial authority and thereby waives his rights to
immunity from civil liability. The 14th Amendment guarantees the
fundamental rights of citizens to due process and such rights require
strict scrutiny of the Court. The Respondent therefore puts the Court
on notice that the Respondent intends to defend his rights and to
hold the Court liable for acts the Court takes against the Respondent
that are done in the absence of judicial authority.

“An expression of opinion on the merits of the case prior to hearing the evidence
is indicative of bias.” State v. Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 822.


On a motion to dismiss the court will construe the complaint liberally and assume all factual allegations to be true. (Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997). The court will not grant the motion to dismiss "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim[s] which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson.

Because the Plaintiff is pro se, the court has a higher standard when faced with a motion to dismiss. White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 makes this point clear and states:

A court faced with a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint alleging violations of civil rights must read the complaint's allegations expansively, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), and take them as true for purposes of deciding whether they state a claim. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972). Moreover, "the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." onner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)).

Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion to dismiss, this court would have to apply the standards of White v. Bloom. That means if this court can figure out a legal theory that the Plaintiff hasn't thought of, this court must deny a motion to dismiss on the court's legal theory. And considering that the Plaintiff is suing lawyers and judges who are part of the "brotherhood", this court has an obligation to try hard to come up with that legal theory to avoid the appearance of bias.

Plaintiff need not allege personal involvement by all the parties. When a person is part of a conspiracy, one does not require a hub and spoke form. One need only be part of a chain of conspirators. Ms. Stringfellow need not have had personal contact with Judge Syler nor had a meeting of the minds with Judge Syler herself. Ms. Stringfellow employed Mr. Sharp as her agent who did the dirty work in her behalf with her full knowledge and approval. Likewise, The Bar Plan is fully liable under the allegation that their lawyer, Mr. Duncan, who represented them did violate the laws with The Bar Plan's full knowledge and approval. So even if Respondent Superior fails, The Bar Plan was an active participant in the conspiracy.





UNDER THE BIFURCATED MODEL, A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT EITHER MAY DELEGATE TO HIS ATTORNEY FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCTING HIS TRIAL OR MAY APPEAR PRO SE, I.E., ACT AS HIS OWN ATTORNEY. COURTS HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AND TO DEFENSE PRO SE ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. UNDER THE HYBRID MODEL, THE DEFENDANT HAS THE ACTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BUT MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE IN HIS OWN DEFENSE AS CO-COUNSEL. THE HYBRID MODEL FOCUSES ON THE DEFENDANT AS THE PERSON WHO CONTROLS THE MODE OF HIS REPRESENTATION AND THE CONDUCT OF HIS DEFENSE. JUDICIAL DECISIONS RELEVANT TO THE BIFURCATED MODEL OF REPRESENTATION RIGHTS ARE REVIEWED, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO HYBRID REPRESENTATION IS ANALYZED. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT, UNLIKE THE BIFURCATED MODEL, THE HYBRID MODEL ACCOMMODATES THE FUNDAMENTAL VALUES UNDERLYING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS THE 'CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED APPROACH', FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

Because a defendant has no constitutional right to hybrid representation, the decision to allow such representation lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Indeed, many jurisdictions have refused to recognize a right of counseled defendants to act in their own defense, leaving it to the discretion of the trial court to determine whether such participation is permitted (see, e.g., United States v Einfeldt, 138 F3d 373, 378 [8th Cir], cert denied 525 US 851; United States v Tutino, 883 F2d 1125, 1141 [2d Cir], cert denied 493 US 1081; United States v LaChance, 817 F2d 1491, 1498 [11th Cir], cert denied 484 US 928; United States v Mosely, 810 F2d 93, 97-98 [6th Cir], cert denied 484 US 841; United States v Halbert, 640 F2d 1000, 1009 [9th Cir]; State v Frye, 224 Conn 253, 256, 617 A2d 1382, 1384-1385; State v Long, 216 NJ Super 269 275-276, 523 A2d 672, 675-676).

Nevertheless, defendant maintains that a court confronted with a pro se motion should, at minimum, inquire into whether "the defense attorney is aware of the existence of the motion and has discussed its contents with his or her client" (People v Renaud, 145 AD2d 367, 369-370, appeal dismissed , 74 NY2d 734; see also, People v Costas, 248 AD2d 482, 483, lv denied , 91 NY2d 971). While such inquiries may be the better practice, we will not compel courts to engage in any particular catechism before deciding whether to entertain a pro se motion. Neither our Constitution nor our precedent requires it. Rather, the decision to allow hybrid representation implicates the trial court's function in ensuring the orderly administration of the proceedings (see, People v Mirenda, supra, 57 NY2d, at 266). As such, it is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the Trial Judge.